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lntentio Lectoris 
The State of the Art 
Umberto Eco 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decades we have witnessed a change of 
paradigm in the theories of textual interpretation. Within a struc-
turalistic framework, to take into account the role of the addressee 
seemed like a disturbing intrusion since the current dogma was 
that a textual structure should be analyzed in itself and for the 
sake of itself, in an attempt to isolate its formal structures. 
On the contrary, during the seventies literary theorists-as 
well as linguists and semioticians-had focused on the pragmatic 
aspect of reading. The dialectic between Author and Reader, Send-
er and Addressee, Narrator and Narratee has generated a crowd, 
indeed impressive, of semiotic or extrafictional narrators, subjects 
of the uttered utterance (enonciation enoncee), focalizers, voices, 
metanarrators, as well as an equally impressive crowd of virtual, 
ideal, implied or implicit, model, projected, presumed, informed 
readers, metareaders, archireaders, and so on. 
As a result, different critical theories-such as the aesthetics 
of reception, hermeneutics, the semiotic theories of interpretative 
cooperation, reader-response criticism, up to the scarcely homo-
This paper originally given as part of the Queens College Visiting Humanist 
Series in the Fall of 1987. 
DIFFERENTIA 2 (Spring 1988) 
DIFFERENT/A 148 
geneous archipelago of deconstruction-have appointed as the 
main object of their research not so much the empirical results of 
given personal or collective acts of reading (studied by a sociology 
of reception), but the very function of construction--or decon-
struction--of a text performed by its interpreter-insofar as such 
a function is implemented, encouraged, prescribed, or permitted 
by the textual linear manifestation or by the very nature of 
semiosis. 
It seems to me that the general assumption underlying each 
of these theories is: The functioning of a text (including non-verbal 
ones) can be explained by taking into account not only its genera-
tive process but also (or, for the most radical theories, exclusively) 
the role performed by the addressee and (at most) the way in 
which the text foresees and directs this kind of interpretative 
cooperation. 
It must also be stressed that such an addressee-oriented 
approach concerns not only literary and artistic texts, but every 
sort of semiotic phenomenon, including everyday linguistic utter-
ances, visual signals, and so on. In other words, addressee-
oriented theories assume that the meaning of every message 
depends on the interpretative choices of its receptor; even the 
meaning of the most univocal message uttered in the course of 
the most normal communicative intercourse depends on the re-
sponse of its addressee, and this response is in some way context-
sensitive. Naturally, such an allegedly open-ended nature of mes-
sages is more evident in those texts that have been conceived in 
order to magnify this semiotic possibility, that is, in so-called 
artistic texts. I insist on this point because during the previous 
decades artistic texts were taken as the only phenomenon able to 
display, provocatively, the still unacknowledged open-ended na-
ture of texts. On the contrary, in the last decades such a nature 
has been theoretically rooted in the very nature of any kind of 
text. In other words, before the change of the paradigm, artistic 
texts were seen as the only cases in which a semiotic system, be 
it verbal or otherwise, magnified the role of the addressee-the 
basic and normal function of such a system being instead that of 
allowing an ideal condition of univocality, independently of the 
idiosyncrasies of the receiver. On the contrary, in the last decades, 
semiotic theories have insisted on the fact that-even though in 
everyday life we are obliged to exchange many univocal messages, 
hardly working in order to reduce ambiguity-the dialectic be-
tween sender, addressee, and context is at the very core of 
semiosis. 
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2. ARCHAEOLOGY 
Undoubtedly the universe of literary studies has been haunted 
in the last few years by the ghost of the reader. To prove this 
assumption it will be interesting to ascertain how and to what 
extent such a ghost has been conjured up by different theorists, 
coming from different theoretical traditions. 
The first who explicitly spoke of an "implied author" ("carry-
ing the reader with him") was certainly Wayne Booth in 1961. 
After him we can isolate two independent lines of research that, 
up to a certain point, ignored each other: namely, the semiotico-
structural one and the hermeneutic one. 
The first line stems from Communications 8, where Barth es 
spoke of a material author who cannot be identified with the 
narrator, Todorov evoked the couple, "image of the narrator-
image of the author," and recovered the Anglo-Saxon theories of 
the point of view (from Henry James, Percy Lubbock, Forster, 
until Pouillon 1946), and Genette started to elaborate the categories 
(definitely dealt with in 1972) of voice and focalization. Then, 
through some observations of Kristeva (1970) on "textual produc-
tivity," certain lucid pages of Lotman (1970), the still empirical 
concept of archilecteur by Riffaterre (1971), the discussions on the 
conservative standpoint of Hirsch (1967), the debate reached the 
most complex notions of implied reader in Corti (1976) and Chat-
man (1978). It is interesting to remark that the last two authors 
drew their definition directly from Booth, ignoring the similar 
definition proposed by Iser in 1972. The same happened to me 
as I elaborated my notion of Model Reader along the mainstream 
of the semiotic-structuralistic line, matching these results with 
some suggestions borrowed from various discussions on the 
modal logic of narrativity (mainly van Djik, Petofi, and Schmidt) 
as well as from some hints furnished by Weinrich-not to mention 
the idea of an "ideal reader" devised by Joyce in Finnegans Wake. 
It is also interesting to remark that Corti (1976) traces back 
the discussion on the non-empirical author to Foucault (1969) 
where, in a post-structuralistic atmosphere, the problem is posed 
of an author as a "way of being within the discourse," as a field 
of conceptual coherence, or as a stylistic unity, which as such 
could not but elicit the corresponding idea of a reader as a way 
of recognizing such a being-within-the-discourse. 
The second lineage is represented by Iser (1972), who starts 
from Booth's proposal but elaborates his suggestion on the basis 
of a different tradition (Ingarden, Gadamer, and naturally Jauss-
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who in his turn was developing some of the suggestions of the 
Russian Formalists and the Prague School). Iser was also largely 
influenced (as is demonstrated by the bibliographical references 
of Der implizite Leser) by the Anglo-Saxon theorists of narrativity 
(well known to Todorov and Genette) and by Joyce (criticism). 
One finds in the first Iser book few references to the structuralistic 
lineage (the only important source is Mukatovsky). It is only in 
The Act of Reading (1976) that Iser tries to reconnect the two 
lineages, with references to Jakobson, Lotman, Hirsch, Riffaterre, 
as well as to some of my remarks of the early sixties. 
Such an insistence on the moment of reading, coming from 
different directions, seems to reveal a felicitous plot of the Zeitgeist. 
And, speaking of the Zeitgeist, it is curious to notice that at the 
beginning of the eighties Charles Fillmore, coming from the au-
tonomous and different tradition of generative semantics (critically 
reviewed), wrote an essay on "Ideal Readers and Real Readers" -
without any conscious reference to the above mentioned debates. 
Certainly all these author/reader couples do not have the same 
theoretical status (see, for a brilliant map of their mutual differ-
ences and identities, Pugliatti 1985). In fact, the most important 
problem at this juncture is to ascertain whether such a reader-
oriented field really represented a new trend in aesthetic and 
semiotic studies. 
The whole history of aesthetics can be traced back to a history 
of theories of interpretation and of the effect that a work of art 
provokes upon its addressee. I consider response-oriented the 
Aristotelian Poetics, pseudo-Longinian aesthetics of the Sublime, 
the medieval theories of beauty as the final result of a visio, the 
new reading of Aristotle performed by the Renaissance theorists 
of drama, many eighteenth-century theories of art and beauty, 
most of Kantian aesthetics, not to speak of many contemporary 
critical and philosophical approaches, namely: 
(a) Russian Formalists, with their notion of "device" as the 
way in which the work of art elicits a particular type of 
perception 
(b) Ingarden's attention to the reading process, his notion of 
the literary work as a skeleton or "schematized structure" 
to be completed by the reader, and his idea, clearly due 
to Husserl's influence, of the dialectics between the work 
as an invariant and the plurality of profiles through which 
it can be concretized by the interpreter; 
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(c) The aesthetics of Mukafovsky; 
(d) Gadamer' s hermeneutics; and 
(e) The early German sociology of literature (see Holub 
1984:2). 
As for contemporary semiotic theories, they took into account 
from the beginning the pragmatic moment. Even without speaking 
of the central role played by interpretation and "unlimited 
semiosis" in C. S. Peirce's thought, it would be enough to remark 
that Charles Morris in Foundations of a Theory of Signs (1938) re-
minded us that a reference to the role of the interpreter was always 
present in Greek and Latin rhetoric, in the communication theory 
of the Sophists, and in Aristotle, not to mention Augustine, for 
whom signs were characterized by the fact that they produce an 
idea in the mind of their receivers. 
During the sixties, many of the Italian semiotic approaches 
were influenced by the sociological studies on the reception of· 
mass media. In 1965 at the convention held in Perugia on the 
relationship between television and its audience, I myself, Paolo 
Fabbri, and others insisted on the fact that it was not enough to 
study what a message says according to the code of its senders, 
but one must also study what it says according to the code of its 
addressees. The idea of "aberrant decoding," proposed at that 
time, was further elaborated in my La struttura assente (1968). Thus, 
in the sixties the problem of reception was posited ( or re-posited) 
by semiotics as a reaction against (i) the structuralist idea that a 
textual object was something independent of its interpretations, 
and (ii) the stiffness of many formal semantics flourishing in the 
Anglo-Saxon area, where the very meaning of a term or a sentence 
was studied as independent of its context. Only later this dictio-
nary-like semantics was challenged by encyclopedia-like models 
that tried to introduce into the core of the semantic representation 
also pragmatic elements-and only recently Cognitive Science and 
Artificial Intelligence have decided that an encyclopedia model 
seems to be the most convenient way to represent meaning and 
to process texts (see on this debate Eco 1976, 1984). 
In order to reach such an awareness, it has been necessary 
for linguistics to move toward pragmatic phenomena, and in this 
sense the role of speech-act theory should not be underestimated. 
In the literary domain, Iser (1972) was probably the first to acknowl-
edge the convergence between the new linguistic perspectives 
and the literary theory of reception, devoting as he did a whole 
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chapter of Der Akt des Lesens to the problems raised by Austin and 
Searle (five years before the first organic attempt to elaborate a 
theory of literary discourse based upon the speech-act theory; see 
Pratt 1977). 
Thus, what Jauss in 1969 was announcing as a profound 
change in the paradigm of literary scholarship was in fact a general 
change taking place already in the semiotic paradigm as well-
even though, as I said, this change was not a brand-new discovery 
but rather the complex concoction of different venerable ap-
proaches that had characterized at different times the whole his-
tory of aesthetics and a great part of the history of semiotics. 
Nevertheless, it is not true that nihil sub sole novi. Old (theoretical) 
objects can reflect a different light under the sun's rays, according 
to the season. 
I remember how outrageous sounded to many my Opera aperta 
(1962), in which I stated that artistic and literary works, by foresee-
ing a system of psychological, cultural, and historical expectations 
on the part of their addressees, try to produce what Joyce called 
an "ideal reader . "1 
Obviously, speaking at that time of works of art, I was in-
terested in the fact that such an ideal reader was obliged to suffer 
from an ideal insomnia in order to question the book ad infinitum. 
My problem was how and to what extent a text should foresee 
the reactions of its addressee. In Opera aperta-at least at the time 
of the first Italian edition, written between 1957 and 1962-1 was 
still moving in a pre-semiotic area, inspired as I was by Information 
Theory, the semantics of Richards, the epistemology of Piaget, 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, transactional 
psychology, and the aesthetic theory of interpretation of Luigi 
Pareyson. In that book, and with a jargon I would not use today, 
I was writing: 
now we must shift our attention from the message, as a source of 
possible information, to the communicative relationship between 
message and addressee, where the interpretative decision of the 
receptor contributes to establishing the value of the possible infor-
mation . . .. If one wants to analyze the possibilities of a communica-
tive structure one must take into account the receptor pole. To 
consider this psychological pole means to acknowledge the formal 
possibility-as such indispensable in order to explain both the struc-
ture and the effect of the message-by which a message signifies 
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only insofar as it is interpreted from the point of view of a given 
situation, a psychological as well as a historical, social and an-
thropological one. 2 
All these assumptions sounded pretty polemical in the sixties 
because the structuralistic orthodoxy was still standing under the 
standards of the "aesthetic-formalist" third paradigm designed by 
Jauss (1969). In 1967, speaking in the course of an interview of 
my book Opera aperta, just translated into French, Claude Levi-
Strauss said that he was reluctant to accept my perspective because 
a work of art 
is an object endowed with precise properties, that must be analyt-
ically isolated, and this work can be entirely defined on the grounds 
of such properties. When Jakobson and myself tried to make a 
structural analysis of a Baudelaire sonnet, we did not approach it 
as an "open work" in which we could find everything that has 
been filled in by the following epochs; we approached it as an 
object which, once created, had the stiffness-so to speak-of a 
crystal; we confined ourselves to bringing into evidence these prop-
erties. (Levi-Strauss 1969:81) 
I have already discussed this opinion in the introductory chap-
ter of my The Role of the Reader, making it clear that, by stressing 
the role of the interpretative choice in the making up of the sense 
of a text, I was not assuming that in an "open work" one can find 
that "everything" has been filled in by its different empirical read-
ers, irrespective or in spite of the properties of the textual objects. 
I was, on the contrary, assuming that an artistic text contained, 
among its major analyzable properties, certain structural devices 
that encourage and elicit interpretative choices. However, I am 
quoting that old discussion in order to show how very daring it 
was, during the sixties, to introduce the interpretative moment, 
or, if one wants, the act of reading, into the description and the 
evaluation of the text to be read. 
Even though I stressed in Opera aperta the role of the interpre-
ter ready to risk an ideal insomnia in order to pursue infinite 
interpretations , I insisted on the fact that one ought always to 
question a text as an object, and not on the mere grounds of one's 
personal drives. Depending as I did on the aesthetics of interpre-
tation of Luigi Pareyson, I was still speaking of a dialectic between 
fidelity and freedom. I am insisting on this point because if during 
the "structuralist sixties" my addressee-oriented position (neither 
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so provocative nor so unbearably original) appeared so very "rad-
ical," today it would sound pretty conservative, at least from the 
point of view of the most radical reader-response theories. 
3. A WEB OF CRITICAL OPTIONS 
The opposition between the generative approach (according 
to which the theory isolates the rules for the production of a 
textual object that can be understood independently of its effects) 
and interpretive approach is not homogeneous with the threefold 
contrast, widely discussed in the course of a secular critical debate, 
between interpretation as the search for the intentio auctoris, in-
terpretation as the search for the intentio operis, and interpretation 
as the imposition of the intentio lectoris. 
The classical debate aimed at finding in a text either (a) what 
its author intended to say, or (b) what the text said independently 
of the intentions of its author. 
Only after we accepted the second horn of the dilemma did 
the question become whether to find in a text (i) what it says by 
virtue of its textual coherence and of an original underlying signifi-
cation system, or (ii) what the addressees find in it by virtue of 
their own systems of signification or their wishes and drives. 
Such a debate is of paramount importance, but its terms only 
partially overlap the opposition generation/interpretation. One 
can describe a text as generated according to certain rules without 
assuming that its author intentionally and consciously followed 
them. One can adopt a hermeneutic viewpoint without prejudging 
whether the interpretation must find what the author meant or 
what Being says through language-in the second case, without 
prejudging whether the voice of Being is influenced by the drives 
of the addressee or not. If one crosses the opposition generation/in-
terpretation with the trichotomy of intentions, one can get six 
potential different theories and critical methods. 
Facing the possibility, displayed by a text, of eliciting infinite 
or indefinite interpretations, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance 
reacted by means of two different hermeneutic options. Medieval 
interpreters looked for a plurality of senses without rejecting a 
sort of identity principle (a text cannot support contradictory in-
terpretations), while the symbolists of the Renaissance, following 
the idea of the coincidentia oppositorum, defined the ideal text as 
the one that allows the most contradictory readings (see Eco 1985). 
Moreover, the adoption of the Renaissance model generates 
a secondary contradiction, since a hermetico-symbolic reading can 
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search in a text either for (i) the infinity of senses planned by the 
author or for (ii) the infinity of senses that the author ignored. 
Naturally, option (ii) generates a further choice; namely, whether 
these unforeseen senses are discovered because of the intentio 
operis, or in spite of it, forced into the text by an arbitrary decision 
of the reader. 
Even if one says, as Valery did, that il n'y a pas de vrai sens 
d'un texte, one has not yet decided on which of the three intentions 
the infinity of interpretations depends. Medieval and Renaissance 
Kabbalists maintained that the Torah was open to infinite interpre-
tations because it could be rewritten in infinite ways by combining 
its letters, but such an infinity of readings (as well as of writings)-
certainly dependent on the initiative of the reader-was nonethe-
less planned by the divine Author. 
To privilege the initiative of the reader does not necessarily 
mean to guarantee the infinity of readings. If one privileges the 
initiative of the reader, one must also consider the possibility of 
an active reader who decides to read a text univocally: it is a 
privilege of fundamentalists to read the Bible according to a single 
literal sense. 
We can conceive of an aesthetics claiming that poetic texts 
can be infinitely interpreted because their authors wanted them 
to read this way; or an aesthetics which claims that texts must be 
read univocally in spite of the intentions of their authors who are 
compelled by the laws of language and who, once they have 
written something, are bound to read what they wrote in the only 
authorized and possible sense. One can read as infinitely interpret-
able a text conceived as absolutely univocal (see for instance the 
reading performed by Derrida upon a text of Searle in "Signature, 
evenement, contexte") as well as one can perform psychedelic 
trips upon a text that cannot be but univocal according to the 
intentio operis (for instance, when one muses oneirically upon the 
railway timetable). Alternatively, one can read as univocal a text 
that its author wanted infinitely interpretable (it would be the 
case of fundamentalists if by chance Kabbalists were right), or to 
read univocally a text that from the point of view of linguistic 
rules should be considered rather ambiguous (for instance, read-
ing Oedipus Rex as a plain mystery story where what counts is 
only to find out the guilty one). 
It is in the light of this embarrassingly vast typology that we 
should reconsider many contemporary critical currents that can 
superficially be ranked, all together, under the heading of re-
sponse-oriented theories. For instance, classical sociology of liter-
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ature records what readers do with a text, and it can remain 
basically uninterested in deciding on which intention what they 
do depends-since it simply describes social usages, socialized 
interpretations, and the actual public effect of texts, not the formal 
devices or the hermeneutic mechanisms that have produced them. 
On the contrary, the aesthetics of reception maintains that a liter-
ary work is enriched by the various interpretations it underwent 
along the centuries and, while considering the dialectic between 
textual devices and the horizon of expectations of the readers, 
does not deny that every interpretation can and must be compared 
with the textual object and with the intentio operis. Likewise, the 
semiotic theories of interpretative cooperation, like my theory of 
Model Reader, look at the textual strategy as a system of instructions 
aimed at producing a possible reader whose profile is designed 
by and within the text, can be extrapolated from it, and described 
independently of and even before any empirical reading. 
In a totally different way, the most radical practices of decon-
struction privilege the initiative of the reader and reduce the text 
to an ambiguous bunch of still unshaped possibilities, thus trans-
forming texts into mere stimuli for the interpretative drift. 
4. AN APOLOGY FOR THE LITERAL SENSE 
Every discourse on the freedom of interpretation must start 
from a defense of literal sense. In 1985 Ronald Reagan, during a 
microphone test before a public speech, said P (namely : "In a few 
minutes I'll push the red button and I'll start bombing the Soviet 
Union," or something to that effect). P was-as Linear Text Man-
ifestation-an English sentence that according to common codes 
means exactly what it intuitively means. If you prefer, given an 
intelligent machine with paraphrase rules, P could be translated 
as "the person uttering the pronoun I will in the next 200 seconds 
send American missiles toward Soviet territory ." If texts have 
intentions, P had the intention to say so. 
The newsmen who heard P wondered whether its utterer too 
had the intention to say so. Asked about that, Reagan said that 
he was joking . He said so-as far as the intentio operis was con-
cerned-but according to the intentio auctoris he only pretended to 
say so. According to common sense, those who believed that the 
sentence-meaning coincided with the intended authorial-meaning 
were wrong. 
In criticizing severely Reagan's joke some journalists, how-
ever, tried to make an innuendo (intentio lectoris) and inferred that 
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the real intention of Reagan was to nonchalantly suggest that he 
was such a tough guy that, if he wanted, he could have done 
what he only pretended to do (also because he had the performa-
tive power of doing things with words). 
This story is scarcely suitable for my purposes because it is 
a report about a fact-that is, about a "real" communicative inter-
course during which senders and addressees had the chance to 
check the discrepancies between sentence-meaning and authorial-
meaning. Let us suppose, then, that this story does not concern 
a fact, but is a pure story (told in the form "Once a man said 
so-and-so, and people believed so-and so, and then that man 
added so-and-so ... "). In this case we have lost any guarantee 
about the authorial intention, this author having simply become 
one of the characters of the narration. How do we interpret this 
story? It can be the story of a man making a joke, the story of a 
man who jokes but shouldn't, the story of a man who pretends 
to joke but as a matter of fact is uttering a threat, the story of a 
tragic world where even innocent jokes can be taken seriously, 
the story of how the same jocular sentence can change in meaning 
according to the status and the role of its utterer .... Would we 
say that this story has a single sense, all the listed ones, or that 
only some of them can be considered as the "correct" ones? 
Two years ago Derrida wrote me a letter to inform me that 
he and other people were establishing in Paris a College Interna-
tional de Philosophie and to ask me for a letter of support . I bet 
that Derrida was assuming that: 
• I had to assume that he was telling the truth ; 
• I had to read his program as a univocal discourse as far as both the 
the actual situation and his projects were concerned; 
• My signature requested at the end of my letter would have been 
taken more seriously than Searle's one at the end of "Signature, 
evenement , contexte." 
Naturally, according to my Erwartungshorizon, Derrida's letter 
could have assumed for me many other additional meanings, even 
the most contradictory ones, and could have elicited many addi-
tional inferences about its "intended meaning"; nevertheless, any 
additional inference ought to be based upon its first layer of al-
legedly literal meaning. I think that Derrida could not but agree 
with me: in Grammatology he reminds his readers that 
[without] all the instruments of traditional criticism . .. critical 
production would risk developing in any direction at all, and au-
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thorize itself to say almost anything. But this indispensable guard-
rail has always only protected, it has never opened, a reading. [158 
of the English tr.] 
I feel sympathetic with the project of opening readings but I 
also feel the fundamental duty of protecting them in order to open 
them, since I consider it risky to open in order to protect. Thus, 
coming to Reagan's story, my conclusion is that, in order to ex-
trapolate from it any possible sense, one is first of all obliged to 
recognize that it has a literal sense, namely, that on a given day 
a man said P and that P, according to the English code, means 
what it intuitively means. 
5. Two LEVELS OF INTERPRETATION 
Before going further ahead with the problem of interpretation, 
we must first settle a terminological question. We must distinguish 
between semantic and critical interpretation (or, if one prefers, 
between semiosic and semiotic interpretation). Semantic interpreta-
tion is the result of the process by which an addressee, facing a 
linear textual manifestation, fills it up with a given meaning . Every 
response-oriented approach deals first of all with this type of 
interpretation, which is a natural semiosic phenomenon. Critical 
interpretation is, on the contrary, a metalinguistic activity-a 
semiotic approach-which aims at describing and explaining for 
which formal reasons a given text produces a given response (and 
in this sense it can also assume the form of an aesthetic analysis). 
In this sense every text is susceptible to being both semanti-
cally and critically interpreted, but only few texts consciously 
foresee both kinds of response. Ordinary sentences uttered by a 
layman (like "Give me that bottle" or "The cat is on the mat") 
only expect a semantic response. On the contrary, aesthetic texts 
or sentences such as "The cat is on the mat" uttered by a linguist 
as an example of possible semantic ambiguity also foresee a critical 
interpreter. Likewise, when I say that every text designs its own 
Model Reader, I am in fact implying that many texts aim at pro-
ducing two Model Readers: a first or naive level, supposed to 
understand semantically what the text says, and a second or critical 
level, supposed to appreciate the way in which the text says such 
an utterance. A sentence like "They are flying planes" foresees a 
naive reader who keeps wondering which meaning to choose-
and who supposedly looks at the textual environment or at the 
circumstance of the utterance in order to support the best choice-
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and a critical reader able to univocally and formally explain the 
syntactic reasons that make the sentence ambiguous. Similarly, a 
mystery tale displays an astute narrative strategy in order to pro-
duce a naive Model Reader eager to fall into the traps of the 
narrator (to feel fear or to suspect the innocent one), but usually 
wants to produce also a critical Model Reader able to enjoy, at a 
second reading, the brilliant narrative strategy by which the first-
level naive reader has been designed. 3 
In the light of the above observations, let me now discuss a 
distinction between two interpretative theories of our time pro-
posed by Richard Rorty in his essay "Idealism and Textualism" 
(in Consequences of Pragmatism, 1982). Rorty says that in the present 
century "there are people who write as if there were nothing but 
texts," and he makes a distinction between two kinds of tex-
tualisms. The first is instantiated by those who disregard the in-
tention of the author and look in the text for a principle of internal 
coherence and/or for a sufficient cause for certain very precise 
effects it has on a presumed ideal reader. The second is instantiated 
by those critics who consider every reading as a misreading (the 
"misreaders"). For them, says Rorty, "the critic asks neither the 
author nor the text about their intentions but simply beats the 
text into a shape which will serve his own purpose. He makes 
the text refer to whatever is relevant to that purpose." In this 
sense their model 
is not the curious collector of clever gadgets taking them apart to 
see what makes them work and carefully ignoring any extrinsic 
end they may have, but the psychoanalyst blithely interpreting a 
dream or a joke as a symptom of homicidal mania. (151) 
Rorty thinks that both positions are a form of pragmatism 
(pragmatism being for him the refusal to think of truth as corre-
spondence to reality-and reality being, I assume, both the exter-
nal referent of the text and the intention of its author) and suggests 
that the first type of theorist is a weak pragmatist because "he 
thinks that there really is a secret and that once it's discovered 
we shall have gotten the text right," so that for him "criticism is 
discovery rather than creation" (152). On the contrary, the strong 
pragmatist does not make any difference between finding and 
making. 
I can accept such a characterization, but with two emenda-
tions. 
First of all, in which sense does a weak pragmatist, when 
trying to find the secret of a text, aim at getting this text "right"? 
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One has to decide if by "getting the text right" one means a right 
semantic or a right critical interpretation. Those readers who, 
according to the Jamesian metaphor proposed by Iser (1976:ch.1), 
look into a text in order to find in it "the figure in the carpet," a 
single unrevealed secret meaning, are-I think-looking for a sort 
of "concealed" semantic interpretation. But the critic looking for 
the "secret code" probably looks critically for the describable 
strategy that produces infinite ways to get a text semantically right. 
To analyze and describe the textual "devices" of Ulysses means to 
show how Joyce acted in order to create many alternative figures 
in his carpet, without deciding how many they can be and which 
of them are the best ones. Obviously, since even a critical reading 
is always conjectural (see 6, below), there can be many ways of 
finding out that secret code, but to look for it does not mean that 
one wants to reduce a text to a univocal semantic reading. Thus, 
I do not think that the first type of textualist designed by Rorty 
is necessarily a "weak" pragmatist. 
Secondly, I suspect that many "strong" pragmatists are not 
pragmatists at all-at least in Rorty's sense, because the "mis-
reader" employs a text in order to know something which stands 
outside the text-and that is in some way more "real" than the 
text itself, namely, the unconscious mechanism of la chafne sig-
nifiante. In any case, even though a pragmatist, certainly the mis-
reader is not a "textualist." Probably misreaders think, as Rorty 
assumes, that there is nothing but texts. However, they are in-
terested in every possible text except the one they are reading. 
As a matter of fact, "strong" pragmatists are only concerned with 
the infinite semantical readings of the text they are beating about, 
but I suspect that they are scarcely interested in the way it works. 
6. INTERPRETATION AND USE 
I can accept the distinction proposed by Rorty but I see it as 
a convenient opposition between interpreting (both semantically 
and critically) and merely using a text. To critically interpret a text 
means to read it in order to discover, along with my reactions to 
it, something about its nature. To use a text is to start from a 
stimulus in order to get something else, even accepting the risk 
of misinterpreting it from the semantical point of view. If I tear 
out the pages of my Bible and wrap my pipe tobacco in them, I 
am using this Bible, but it would be daring to call me a textualist-
even though I am, if not a strong pragmatist, certainly a very 
pragmatic person. If I get sexual enjoyment from a pornographic 
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book, I am not using it, because in order to elaborate my sexual 
fantasies I had to semantically interpret its sentences. On the 
contrary, if-let us suppose-I look into the Elements of Euclid to 
infer that their author was a scopophiliac, obsessed with abstract 
images, then I am using it because I refuse to interpret its defi-
nitions and theorems semantically. 
The quasi-psychoanalytic reading that Derrida makes of Poe's 
"Purloined Letter" in Le facteur de la verite represents a good critical 
interpretation of that story. Derrida insists on the fact that he is 
not analyzing the unconscious of the author but rather the uncon-
scious of the text. He is interpreting because he respects the intentio 
operis. When he draws an interpretation from the fact that the 
letter is found in a paper holder hanging from a nail under the 
center of a fireplace, he first takes "literally" the possible world 
designed by the narration as well as the sense of the words used 
by Poe to set up this world. Then he tries to isolate a second 
"symbolical" meaning that this text is conveying, probably beyond 
the intentions of its author. Right or wrong, Derrida however 
does support his second-level semantic interpretation with textual 
evidence. In doing so, he also performs a critical interpretation 
because he shows how the text can produce that second-level 
semantic meaning. 
On the contrary, let us consider the way followed by Maria 
Bonaparte when analyzing Poe's work. Part of her reading repre-
sents a good example of interpretation. For instance, she reads 
"Morella," "Ligeia," and "Eleonora" and shows that all three texts 
have the same underlying "fabula": a man in love with an excep-
tional woman who dies of consumption, so that the man swears 
eternal grief; but he does not keep his promise and loves another 
woman; finally, the dead one reappears and wraps the new one 
in the mantle of her funereal power. In a nontechnical way, Maria 
Bonaparte identifies in these three texts the same actantial struc-
tures, speaks of the structure of an obsession, but reads that 
obsession as a textual one, and in doing this reveals the intentio 
operis. Unfortunately, such a beautiful textual analysis is interwo-
ven with biographical remarks that connect textual evidence with 
aspects (known by extra textual sources) of Poe's private life. When 
she says that Poe was dominated by the impression he felt as a 
child when he saw his mother, dead of consumption, lying on 
the catafalque, when she says that in his adult life and in his work 
he was so morbidly attracted by women with funereal features, 
when she reads his stories populated by living corpses in order 
to explain his personal nechrophilia-then she is using and not 
interpreting texts. 
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7. INTERPRETATION AND CONJECTURE 
It is clear that I am trying to keep a dialectical link between 
intentio operis and intentio lectoris. The problem is that, if one 
perhaps knows what is meant by "intention of the reader," it 
seems more difficult to define abstractly what is meant by "inten-
tion of the text ." 
The text intention is not displayed by the Text Linear Manifes-
tation. Or, if it is displayed, it is so in the sense of the purloined 
letter. One has to decide to "see" it. Thus, it is possible to speak 
of text intention only as the result of a conjecture on the part of 
the reader. The initiative of the reader basically consists in making 
a conjecture about the text intention. 
A text is a device conceived in order to produce its Model 
Reader. I repeat that this Reader is not the one who makes the 
only right conjecture. A text can foresee a Model Reader entitled 
to try infinite conjectures. The empirical reader is only an actor 
who makes conjectures about the kind of Model Reader postulated 
by the text . Since the intention of the text is basically to produce 
a Model Reader able to make conjectures about it, the initiative 
of the Model Reader consists in figuring out a Model Author who 
is not the empirical one and that, in the end, coincides with the 
intention of the text. 
Thus, more than a parameter to use in order to validate the 
interpretation, the text is an object that the interpretation builds 
up in the course of the circular effort of validating itself on the 
basis of what it makes up as its result. I am not ashamed to admit 
that in so doing, I am defining the old and still valid hermeneutic 
circle. 
The logic of interpretation is the Peircian logic of abduction 
(see Eco and Sebeok 1984). To make a conjecture means to figure 
out a Law that can explain a Result. The "secret code" of a text 
is such a Law. One could say that in natural sciences the conjecture 
has to try only the Law, since the Result is under everybody's 
eyes, while in textual interpretation only the discovery of a "good" 
Law makes the Result acceptable. But I do not think that the 
difference is so clear-cut. Even in natural sciences no fact can be 
taken as a significant Result without our having first and vaguely 
decided that this fact can be selected among innumerable others 
as a curious Result to be explained. To isolate a fact as a curious 
Result means to have already obscurely thought of a Law of which 
that fact could be the Result. When I start reading a text I never 
know, from the beginning, if I am approaching it from the point 
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of view of a suitable intention. My initiative starts becoming excit-
ing when I discover that my intention could meet the intention 
of that text. 
How does one prove a conjecture about the intentio operis? 
The only way is to check it against the text as· a coherent whole. 
This idea, too, is an old one and comes from Augustine (De doctrina 
christiana): any interpretation given of a certain portion of a text 
can be accepted if it is confirmed, and must be rejected if it is 
challenged, by another portion of the same text. In this sense the 
internal textual coherence controls the otherwise uncontrollable 
drives of the reader. 
Once Borges suggested that it would be exciting to read the 
Imitation of Christ as if it was written by Celine. The game is 
amusing and could be intellectually fruitful. With certain texts it 
could yield new and interesting interpretations. It cannot, how-
ever, work with Thomas a Kempis. I tried: I discovered sentences 
that could have been written by Celine ("Grace loves low things 
and is not disgusted by thorny ones, and likes filthy clothes"). 
But this kind of reading offers a suitable "grid" for very few sen-
tences of the Imitation. Most of the book submits very reluctantly 
to this reading. If, on the contrary, I read the book according to 
the Christian Medieval encyclopedia, it appears textually coherent 
in each of its parts. 
Besides, no responsible deconstructionist has ever challenged 
such a position. Hillis Miller (1980) said that "the readings of 
deconstructive criticism are not the willful imposition by a subjec-
tivity of a theory on the texts, but are coerced by the texts them-
selves" (611). Elsewhere (Thomas Hardy: Distance and Desire) he 
writes that 
it is not true that . . . all readings are equally valid. . . . Some 
readings are certainly wrong .... To reveal one aspect of a work 
of an author often means ignoring or shading other aspects .... 
Some approaches reach more deeply into the structure of the text 
than others. (ix) 
8. THE FALSIFIABILITY OF MISINTERPRETATIONS 
We can thus accept a sort of Popper-like principle according 
to which if there are no rules that help to ascertain which interpre-
tations are the "best ones," there is at least a rule for ascertaining 
which ones are "bad." As mentioned above, this rule says that 
the internal coherence of a text must be taken as a parameter for 
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its interpretations. But in order to do so one needs, at least for a 
short time, a metalanguage which permits the comparison be-
tween a given text and its semantical or critical interpretation. 
Since any new interpretation enriches the text and the text consists 
of its objective Linear Manifestation plus the interpretations it 
received in the course of history, this metalanguage should also 
allow for the comparison between a new and an old interpretation. 
I understand that from the point of view of a radical decon-
struction theory such an assumption can sound unpleasantly 
neopositivistic, and that Derrida's notion of deconstruction and 
drift challenges the very possibility of a metalanguage. But a 
metalanguage does not have to be different from (and more pow-
erful than) ordinary language. The idea of interpretation requires 
that a "piece" of ordinary language be used as the interpretant (in 
the Peircian sense) of another "piece" of ordinary language. When 
one says that man means "human male adult," one is interpreting 
ordinary language through ordinary language, and the second 
"sign"-Peirce observes-is the interpretant of the first one, just 
as the first can become the interpretant of the second one. 
The metalanguage of interpretation is not different from its 
object language . It is a portion of the same language and, in this 
sense, to interpret is a function that every language performs 
when it speaks of itself. It is not the case of asking if this can be 
done. We are doing it, everyday. 
The provocative self-evidence of my last argument suggests 
that we can prove it only by showing that any of its alternatives 
is self-contradictory. 
Let us suppose that there is a theory that literally (not metaphor-
ically) asserts that every interpretation is a misinterpretation. 
Let us suppose that there are two texts O'. and 13 and that we 
have submitted them to a reader in order to elicit his/her textually 
recorded misinterpretation I. 
Take a literate subject X, previously informed that any in-
terpretation must be a misinterpretation, and give him/her the 
three texts O'., 13 and I. 
Ask X if I misinterprets O'. or 13. 
Supposing that X says that I is a misinterpretation of O'., 
would we say that Xis right? Supposing, on the contrary, that X 
says that I is a misinterpretation of 13, would we say that X is 
wrong? 
In both cases, to approve or to disapprove of X's answer 
means to believe not only that a text controls and selects its own 
interpretations but also that it controls and selects its own misin-
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terpretations. The one approving or disapproving of X's answers 
would then act as one who does not really believe that every 
interpretation is a misinterpretation, since he/she would use the 
original text as a parameter for discriminating between texts that 
misinterpret it and texts that misinterpret something else. This 
move would presuppose a previous interpretation of a which 
should be considered the only correct one, as well as a metalan-
guage which describes a and shows on which grounds I is or is 
not a misinterpretation of it. 
It would be embarrassing to maintain that a text elicits only 
misinterpretations except when it is correctly interpreted by the 
warrant of the misinterpretations of other readers. But this is 
exactly what happens with a radical theory of misinterpretation. 
There is another way to escape the contradiction. One should 
assume that every answer of Xis the good one. I can be indif-
ferently the misinterpretation of a, of 13, and of any other possible 
text. But at this point why define I (which is undoubtedly a text 
in its own right) as the misinterpretation of something else? If it 
is the misinterpretation of everything, it then is the misinterpre-
tation of nothing. It exists for its own sake and does need to be 
compared with any other text. 
The solution is elegant, but its result a little inconvenient. It 
destroys the very category of textual interpretation. There are 
texts, but of these nobody can speak. Or, if one speaks, nobody 
can say what one says. Texts, at most, are used as stimuli to 
produce other texts, but once a new text is produced, it cannot 
be referred to its stimulus. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
To defend the rights of interpretation against the mere use 
of a text does not mean that texts must never be used. We are 
using texts everyday and we need to do it, for many respectable 
reasons. It is only important to distinguish use from interpretation. 
A critical reader could also say why certain texts have been 
used in a certain way, finding in their structure the reasons of 
their use or misuse. In this sense a sociological analysis of the 
free uses of texts can support a further interpretation of them. 
In any case, use and interpretation are abstract theoretical 
possibilities. Every empirical reading is always an unpredictable 
mixture of both. It can happen that a play started as use, ends 
by producing a fruitful new interpretation--or vice versa. Some-
times to use texts means to free them from previous interpreta-
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tions, to discover new aspects of them, to realize that previously 
they had been illicitly interpreted, to find out a new and more 
explicative intentio operis, that too many uncontrolled intentions 
of the readers (perhaps disguised as a faithful quest for the inten-
tion of the author) had polluted and obscured it. 
There is also a pretextual reading, performed not in order to 
interpret the text but to show how much language can produce 
unlimited semiosis. Such a pretextual reading has a philosophical 
function, and many of the examples of deconstruction provided 
by Derrida belong to this kind of activity. It so happened that a 
legitimate philosophical practice has been taken as a model for 
literary criticism and for a new trend in textual interpretation. 
Our theoretical duty was to acknowledge that this happened 
and to show why it should not have happened. 
Notes 
1. I realize now that my idea of system of expectations, even though built 
up on the grounds of other theoretical influences, was not so dissimilar from 
Jauss' notion of Erwartungshorizon. 
2. In Opera aperta, 2d ed., pp. 131-32, I was considering under the headings 
of "work of art" not only literary texts but also paintings, cinema, television. I 
am grateful to Wolfgang Iser (1976) for observing not only that some of my 
remarks on nonverbal arts were also relevant for literature (ch. 5), but also (ch. 
3) that my further discussion on iconic signs (Eco 1968) was in support of the 
idea that even literary signs designate "the conditions of conception and percep-
tion which enable the observer to construct the object intended by the sign" 
and therefore "constitute an organization of signifiers which do not serve to 
designate a signified object, but instead designate the instructions for the produc-
tion of the signified." 
3. One could say that, while the semantic reader is planned or instructed 
by the verbal strategy, the critical one is such on the grounds of a mere interpretive 
decision-nothing in the text appearing as an explicit appeal to a second-level 
reading. But it must be noted that many artistic devices, for instance stylistical 
violation of the norm, or defamiliarization, seem to work exactly as self-focusing 
appeals: the text is made in such a way as to attract the attention of a critical 
reader. Moreover, there are texts that explicitly require a second-level reading. 
Take for instance Agatha Christie's The Murder of Roger Ackroyd, which is narrated 
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by a character who, at the end, will be discovered by Poirot as the murderer. 
After his confession, the narrator informs the readers that, if they had paid due 
attention, they could have understood in which precise moment he committed 
his crime because in some reticent way he did say it. See also my analysis of 
Allais's "Un drame bien parisien" (Eco 1979), where it is shown to what extent 
the text, while deceiving, step by step, naive readers, at the same time provides 
them with many clues that could have prevented them from falling into the 
textual trap. Obviously, these clues can be detected only in the course of a 
second reading. 
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